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In this article I explore the relatively neglected usage of conceptions of balance and 
equilibrium in Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony by adopting a contextual 
approach to his writings that situates them in an intellectual and historical milieu in 
which the quest for ‘equilibrium’ had become one of the most important issues of the 
day.   In the first part of the article I show how ideas of balance and equilibrium were 
developing among sources familiar to Gramsci including Italian Fordism, the 
theorists of the Russian Revolution and neo-classical economics.  The second part 
demonstrates how Gramsci developed these ideas within the framework of his theory 
of hegemony.  My aim is not only to provide a new perspective on Gramsci’s 
hegemony, but also, to suggest that incorporating notions of balance and equilibrium 
into the theory will render it more coherent and realistic for its contemporary 








Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony has long enjoyed considerable attention in 
the field of political and ideological analysis.2  Yet there remains little accord among 
a new generation of Gramscians about just what Gramsci understood by hegemony.  
While there is general agreement that the novelty of the theory resides in its 
sophisticated treatment of ‘ideological ascendancy’ in civil society where a dominant 
group uses so-called ‘private institutions’ like the media, the education system and 
various cultural organisations to disseminate its ideas and values in an effort to 
manufacture consent and win legitimacy for its continuing rule,3 the role of the 
economic structure and the central state in the maintenance of hegemony - as well as 
the character of the unity achieved in any hegemonic formation - have continued to 
be significant bones of contention among those who apply the theory. 
 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to the participants of a section I co-organised with Dr John Schwarzmantel at the 
ECPR General Conference in Pisa (2007) - The Continuing Relevance of Antonio Gramsci – and 
colleagues at Essex who provided initial feedback, and also an anonymous referee whose comments 
were very helpful.  I acknowledge too the ESRC’s financial support (Grant Ref. PTA-026-27-1394). 
2 The two most recent developments are Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s ‘re-articulation’ of 
hegemony into poststructuralist theory and Robert Cox’s introduction of hegemony into international 
relations.  See E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics (London, 1985); R. Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations’, in 
Millenium 12, 2, (1983), pp.162-175.   
3 J. Martin, Gramsci’s Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke, 1998), p.114. 
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The debate of course has not remained immune from the history of ideas.  Various 
commentators have traced the intellectual origins and development of Gramsci’s 
hegemony along divergent paths that sustain conflicting opinions on the feasibility 
and nature of its deployment in the present.  While Perry Anderson and Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have situated Gramsci’s hegemony within a 
predominantly Russian Marxist tradition of thought,4 Richard Bellamy and Darrow 
Schecter have more recently argued that it is only in returning Gramsci to his 
historical context in the Italian political tradition of his day that we can hope to grasp 
the nature of his ideas.5  Working within a similar methodological framework as 
Bellamy and Schecter,6 in what follows I intend to return Gramsci once again ‘to his 
historical context’ to explore a particular dimension of his theory of hegemony that 
has been all but neglected in the current literature: namely, the use of conceptions of 
balance and equilibrium in the organization of hegemony.7  As the article will 
demonstrate, this dimension of Gramsci’s hegemony is as much indebted to his roots 
in the Marxist tradition of his day at the Comintern as it is to his Italian origins.  
                                                 
4 P. Anderson, ‘The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci’, in New Left Review, 100, (1976-77), pp.15-18; 
Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, pp.1-65. 
5 R. Bellamy and D. Schecter, Gramsci and the Italian State (Manchester, 1993), p.xv. 
6 Q. Skinner, Visions of Politics, Volume I: Regarding Method (Cambridge, 2002).   
7 Authors who do give some attention to Gramsci’s use of equilibrium and balance are Christine Buci-
Glucksmann, A.R. Buzzi and Joseph Femia.  See C. Buci-Glucksmann , Gramsci and the State 
(London, 1980), pp.93-97; A.R. Buzzi, La Théorie politique d’Antonio Gramsci, (Paris-Louvain, 
1967), pp. 221-223; J. Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness and the 
Revolutionary Process (Oxford, 1981), pp.153-154. 
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However, I should stress from the outset that I do not intend to endorse a ‘Comintern 
Gramsci’ to counter Bellamy and Schecter’s ‘Italian’ Gramsci.  On the contrary, the 
influences that informed Gramsci’s use of the conceptual machinery of balance and 
equilibrium span both the Italian and Marxist traditions, reflecting the extraordinary 
breadth of Gramsci’s interests.  In Part I of the article, I accordingly set out the 
diverse intellectual and historical context in which Gramsci acquired his ideas on 
balance and equilibrium.  On the one hand, I build on aspects of Gramsci’s 
intellectual formation that have been well-covered in the literature to date - Italian 
and American Fordism and Russian Communism - bringing a new perspective and 
focus to them by relating them to balance and equilibrium, while on the other, I 
direct my attention to other sources that have been all but ignored in the current 
literature – neo-classical economics.  In Part II, I turn then to demonstrate how these 
ideas of balance and equilibrium resurfaced among the most central themes in 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony including his treatment of the Party and intellectuals 
as agents of hegemony; the relationship between the three key spheres of society 
(economics, politics and ideology) in the revolutionary process; and finally, his 
conception of a class which ‘leads’ with the ‘ideological consent’ of allied and 
subaltern groups in civil society.  Before turning to the contextual analysis, however, 
I should point out that my interest in this particular aspect of Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony is by no means of a disinterested or an antiquarian nature.  To take up 
again my opening concerns, my contention is in fact that revisiting the intellectual 
history of Gramsci’s hegemony and exploring its reliance on conceptions of balance 
and equilibrium will permit us to perform a redescription of the theory in a way that 
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opens it up to new perspectives and renders it more coherent and useful for 
deployment in ideological analysis today.8  In particular, it allows us to re-assert its 
attractive strategic and organizational qualities in relation to the mediation of power 
by the ‘leading group’ that have been somewhat overlooked in recent years, and 
envisage a theory of hegemony where the emphasis lies on holistic reciprocity rather 
than determinism (whether economic or ideological), and plurality and openness 
rather than closed quasi-authoritarian ‘regulation.’ These, however, are issues which 
will only be worth addressing after the major arguments of this article have been 
presented, beginning with Gramsci’s early experience and interest in the 
organizational principles of Taylorism and Fordism which formed a crucial 




Taylorism and Organizing Optimality 
 
Taylorism and Fordism have usually been considered preoccupations of the later 
Gramsci since it was not until the Prison Notebooks that he engaged in a full analysis 
                                                 
8 Skinner, Visions of Politics, Vol 1, pp.6-7.  Adopting Skinner’s approach of course means rejecting  
what Adam Morton calls the ‘austere historicism’ of Bellamy and Schecter who argue that Gramsci’s 
ideas ‘belong inextricably to a past we can no longer share.’  See Bellamy and Schecter, Gramsci and 
the Italian State, pp.165-167; A. Morton, Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in 
the Global Economy (London, 2007), pp.25-29.      
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of advanced industrial capitalism.9  Moreover, the general tendency in the literature 
to distinguish between an early Gramsci as the theorist of the factory councils at the 
L’Ordine Nuovo and a latter Gramsci who was concerned almost exclusively with 
the construction of the revolutionary party and hegemony has obscured to some 
extent the continuity of interest in Taylorite organizational principles in his 
writings.10  In what follows I show how Taylorism – and especially its vital 
organizing principle of optimality – formed an important intellectual backdrop to 
Gramsci’s development of notions of balance and equilibrium, which would later 
resurface in the Prison Notebooks around the theme of the party, its intellectuals and 
the ideological struggle for hegemony. 
 
It is of course no secret that Gramsci was enthralled by the spectacular achievements 
of Taylorism in Italy from the outset.11  As Franklin Adler has shown, during the ten 
years previous to Gramsci’s arrival in Turin in 1911, the city had become the home 
of Italian Fordism and largely on these grounds had experienced ‘the highest rate of 
industrial growth in Italy.’12  Taylorism essentially involved a set of principles of 
‘scientific management’ for organizing large-scale industrial plants on the basis of 
                                                 
9 See Notebook 22 on ‘Americanism and Fordism.’  A. Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere: Vol.III. ed. 
Valentino Gerratana (Torino, 2007), pp.2139-2181.  
10 See, however, Massimo Salvadori, Gramsci e il problema storica della democrazia (Turin, 1973).     
11 F. Adler, ‘Factory Councils, Gramsci and the Industrialists’, in Antonio Gramsci: Critical 
Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers.  Vol.1. Intellectual and Political Context, ed. J. Martin 
(London and New York, 2002), p.257. 
12 F. Adler, Italian Industrialists from Liberalism to Fascism (Cambridge, 1995), p.35. 
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the most technologically advanced, economically efficient and productive means 
available.  Its main innovation was to optimize the division of labour by a 
combination of centralized management in organization and planning, and an equally 
important decentralization of management functions that could be carried out more 
efficiently at the local level.  From the manager-entrepreneur to the plant manager to 
the technician and industrial labourer, all were specially selected, trained and 
coordinated to ensure that each chain of industry functioned with maximum 
efficiency.13  Turin industrialists not only reaped considerable economic success 
from implementing these Taylorite practices in the car and engineering factories of 
the city, but through their federations - Lega Industriale di Torino and later 
Confindustria - they used Taylorism as the basis of a productivist ideology that 
challenged the ‘divisiveness’ of socialist propaganda and held out instead the 
prospect of ‘national’ expansion for all sectors of Italian society on the back of a 
resurgent industry.  In particular, they stressed the mutual benefits to workers and 
owners – in higher wages and higher profits – of cooperation and submission to ‘the 
directing function’ of the entrepreneur whose expertise in the art of efficiency was 
not governed by class interest, but solely by the need to combine factors of 
production and organize the division of labour on the basis of the input-output 
principle of achieving ‘the maximum effect with the minimum force.’14 
 
                                                 
13 F. Taylor, ‘Scientific Management: Testimony to the House of Representatives Committee, 1912’, 
in Organization Theory, ed. D.S. Pugh (Harmondsworth, 1981), pp.124-146. 
14 Adler, Italian Industrialists from Liberalism to Fascism, pp.45-57. 
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What is crucial in understanding the development of the early Gramsci, and indeed, 
his elaboration of conceptions of balance and equilibrium in his later writings is to 
recognize the extent to which the organizational principles of Italian Fordism became 
integrated into his early and developing theory of the revolutionary party.  As early 
as the winter of 1919 before the factory council movement had been properly 
launched, L’Ordine Nuovo was in fact disseminating the lessons of Taylorism among 
the workers of Turin,15 and Gramsci rapidly became convinced that in order for the 
proletariat to become the new ‘producer class’ it would have to equal and indeed 
surpass capitalism’s formidable organizational capacity, not only in production, but 
in all its revolutionary structures.  In his famous article on ‘Workers’ Democracy’ in 
June 1919 Gramsci thus insisted that a proletarian revolution would only be possible 
if the PSI (Partito Socialista d’Italia), the trade unions and the factory councils were 
optimally organized by ‘coordinating and ordering them into a highly centralized 
hierarchy of competences and powers, while respecting the necessary autonomy and 
articulation of each.’  If the centralizing and decentralizing themes of Taylorism 
were thus present in this article, so too was the rage for efficiency and maximum 
outcomes, as Gramsci maintained that ‘Whoever wills the end, must will the means’ 
and the Italian proletariat could ‘economize on time and effort’ by following the 
example of the Russian Revolution.16 
 
                                                 
15 C. Petri, ‘Il Sistema Taylor e i Consigli dei Produttori’, L’Ordine Nuovo 25 October, 1 November, 8 
November, 15 November, 22 November 1919. 
16 A. Gramsci, ‘Workers’ Democracy’, in Selections from Political Writings 1910-1920, ed. Q. Hoare 
(London, 1977), pp.65-68.  
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As is well known, with the failure of the factory council movement in the summer 
and winter of 1920 Gramsci’s attention turned increasingly to the organization of the 
new emerging PCd’I (Partito Communista d’Italia) as the principle agent of 
revolution.17  But it must be stressed that his taste for the organizational principles of 
the factory and Taylorism did not wane with this development.  On the contrary, the 
Taylorized factory council became the ‘model of communist society’; a society in 
which ‘class divisions will be a thing of the past’ and ‘all social relations will be 
regulated in accordance with the technical requirements of production and its 
corresponding organization.’18  In the Communist Party the worker would therefore 
be transformed from ‘executor to initiator, from mass to leader [my italics]….an 
organizer rather than someone who is organized.’19  Indeed, the slogan of the new 
Communist Party according to Gramsci could only be: ‘organization, maximum 
effort of organization, maximum speed in ordering and organizing the fabric of the 
new party.’20  Although Gramsci was well aware of the technical problems of 
                                                 
17 A. Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci’s Politics (London, 1987), p.49.  The PCI was founded in January 
1921. 
18 A. Gramsci, ‘The Turin Factory Councils Movement’, in Selections from Political Writings 1910-
1920, p.317.  Gramsci was not alone in employing the factory metaphor to examine and address social  
problems in 1920s Europe under the influence of the Second Industrial Revolution and 
‘Americanism.’  See C.S. Maier, ‘Society as Factory’, in In Search of Stability (Cambridge, 1987), 
pp.19-69. 
19 A. Gramsci, ‘The Communist Party’, in Selections from Political Writings 1910-1920, p.333. 
20 A. Gramsci, ‘Caporetto and Vittorio Veneto’, in Selections from Political Writings 1921-1926, ed. 
Quintin Hoare (Minneapolis, 1990), p.3. 
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balancing tasks and materials that all productive processes entailed at this time,21 he 
had not as yet begun to associate these Taylorite ideas with notions of balance and 
equilibrium.  This intellectual transition only occurred thanks to his experience in 
Revolutionary Russia in 1922-1923.  
 
Trotsky and Political and Dynamic Equilibrium 
 
Gramsci’s arrival in Moscow in May 1922 as PCd’I delegate to the Comintern 
actually coincided with the opening of a major economic discussion among leading 
Russian theorists on both the crisis of capitalism and the crisis in the Soviet economy 
which was largely conducted in terms of the capacity of each of the economic 
systems to regain or establish equilibrium.22  While equilibrium – the notion of an 
economy in which the sectors of supply and demand were proportionally and 
optimally balanced - had long enjoyed much currency in liberal economics, the 
increasing interventionist policies of capitalist states in the West and the advent of a 
Russian State that was committed to a programme of state planning and balanced 
growth under the new Gosplan (1921) led to a redescription of this concept in 
                                                 
21 The L’Ordine Nuovo group were especially active in promoting the ‘factory schools’ during the 
biennio rosso whose primary function – beyond the cultural work frequently associated with them – 
was  preparing the workers for replacing the capitalist in production by providing them with technical 
training about effective and efficient production in their industrial sectors and plants.  M. Clark, 
Antonio Gramsci and the Revolution that Failed (New Haven and London, 1977), pp.56-58. 
22 See, A. Belykh, ‘Bogdanov’s Theory of Equilibrium and the Economic Discussions of the 1920s’, 
Soviet Studies, 42, 3 (1990), pp. 571-582. 
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Russian circles.  In my view it was precisely from these Russian sources that 
Gramsci first acquired this conceptual machinery, and in the following two sections I 
explore how Trotsky and Bukharin developed notions of balance and equilibrium – 
under the influence of Taylorism and Bogdanov - beyond economics giving them a 
political, dynamic, holistic and ideological inflection that Gramsci would later 
elaborate on in his theory of hegemony.   
 
It was in fact in the course of two long speeches at the Third (1921) and Fourth 
(1922) World Congresses of the Comintern that Trotsky first began to employ the 
concept of equilibrium in a Marxist context.  As we will see later, Gramsci’s writings 
confirm that he was well aware of the content of these speeches and actually was 
present for Trotsky’s speech at the Fourth World Congress.23  The essential point 
which emerges from Trotsky’s two interventions in respect of equilibrium and the 
economic crises confronted by capitalist and socialist regimes was that both had 
successfully used the coercive and concessionary powers of the state to establish a 
political equilibrium that in turn had helped to restore - or at least ameliorate - 
economic equilibrium.  In the case of capitalism, Trotsky argued that the restoration 
was temporary since ‘the very mainstays of capitalist equilibrium are shaking and 
                                                 
23 G. Fiori, Antonio Gramsci: Life of a Revolutionary (London, 1990), pp.159.  Quinton Hoare has 
already highlighted the importance of this speech by Trotsky for Gramsci’s analysis of Western 
capitalism.  Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p.236.     
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collapsing’ as ‘the crises become more and more prolonged and deeper-going.’24  
This, however, Trotsky insisted, did not guarantee its collapse since ‘economic 
equilibrium’ was closely bound up with ‘political equilibrium’ and capitalism had 
succeeded in manipulating the latter in the post-War period to bring about a 
stabilization making ‘very great concessions’ and ‘throwing sops to the working 
class which ‘the conciliators’ - the ‘social democrats’ and the ‘labour aristocracy’ - 
‘obsequiously converted …into reforms (the 8-hour day, unemployment insurance, 
and so on).’25  Indeed, Trotsky made no apology for the fact that the Soviet State was 
conducting similar policies to facilitate the establishment of its own economic 
equilibrium, and in his Terrorism and Communism (1920) he had even proposed 
using the coercive apparatus of the Russian State to carry out a ‘militarization’ and 
‘Taylorization’ of industry in which the State would effectively take control of the 
trade unions in order to ‘organize’ ‘educate’ ‘discipline’ and ‘group’ ‘the working 
class for the ends of production.’26  By the time Gramsci heard Trotsky address the 
Comintern in 1922, however, he had abandoned this position and came into line with 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) which partially reintroduced competition in the 
Soviet economy to allow the richer peasantry to sell its produce in market conditions 
in return for taxes that would again prove vital for the expansion of Russian 
                                                 
24 L. Trotsky, ‘Report on the World Economic Crisis and the New Tasks of the Communist 
International, Second Session, June 23, 1921’, in The First Five Years of the Communist 
International, Volume I (New York, 1972), pp.174/208.      
25 Trotsky, ‘Report on the World Economic Crisis and the New Tasks of the Communist International, 
Second Session, June 23, 1921’, pp.181/220/223. 
26 L.Trotsky, Terrorism and Communism: A Reply to Karl Kautsky (Michigan, 1961), p.143.  
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industry.27  While remaining confident that ‘capitalist equilibrium’ had been 
‘completely upset’ in the West, in this speech Trotsky focused much more on the 
need for a ‘balance’ in the Soviet economic system, reminding his audience that in 
contrast to ‘the anarchy’ of capitalism it was ‘the task of the Socialist revolution to 
install the rule of reason in the domain of economic life and thereby in all other 
domains of social life.’28   However, as he had done at the previous Congress, he 
consistently  returned to the ‘interrelationship’ between ‘the economic foundation 
and the superstructure,’ claiming that the Soviet system had ‘learned a little from the 
bourgeoisie’ in the practice of alternating ‘repressions and concessions,’ and arguing 
that the ‘Concessions granted by the workers’ state to the bourgeoisie simply 
represent a compromise dictated by the difficulties of development’ which unlike the 
case of capitalism was ‘predetermined and assured by history.’29 
 
If what emerges then from Trotsky’s initial account of equilibrium is a dynamic 
interdependent relationship between politics and economics, he was to give this a 
further dialectical twist by suggesting that capitalist and socialist equilibrium 
developed  inversely.  Although the above implied that the collapse of capitalism was 
inevitable, Trotsky in fact maintained that the development of socialism was by no 
                                                 
27 E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923, Vol II (London, 1963), p.272. 
28 L. Trotsky, ‘Report on the New Soviet Economic Policy and the Perspectives of the World 
Revolution, Delivered at the November 14, 1922 Session of the Fourth World Congress of the 
Comintern’, in The First Five Years of the Communist International, Volume II (New York, 1953), 
pp.226/235. 
29 Ibid, pp.252-253. 
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means guaranteed by economic laws, since capitalism’s dependence on politics in the 
era of economic crisis dictated that it was only in fully adopting the Comintern’s 
United Front strategy of winning over the masses of workers from social democracy 
- ‘who kept the working class within the bounds of bourgeois equilibrium’ - that such 
an outcome could be assured.30  What was required then, according to Trotsky, was 
‘expert tactics’ and ‘strong organization’ in order ‘to gain the majority of the 
working class prior to the decisive events.’  Without this organizational crusade 
Trotsky was emphatic that capitalism – which was ‘not yet dead’ - would ‘continue 
to live in cycles swinging up and down.’31  Gramsci’s later work would show just 
how profound an influence these ideas would have on his theory of hegemony, as 
would those of the other leading light of the early Comintern: Nikolai Bukharin. 
 
Bukharin on Interdependent Development and Ideological Equilibrium 
 
It was in his 1921 book, Historical Materialism: A Popular Manual of Marxist 
Sociology, that Bukharin provided his most comprehensive theory of equilibrium.32   
As is well-known, Gramsci subjected this work to a rigorous and sustained critique 
in the Prison Notebooks due to its foundation in a deterministic, ahistorical and 
                                                 
30 Trotsky, ‘Report on the World Economic Crisis and the New Tasks of the Communist International, 
Second Session, June 23, 1921’, pp.181/222-225. 
31 Ibid, pp.200/224/226. 
32 For its economic propositions, see K.J. Tarbuck, Bukharin’s Theory of Equilibrium (London, 1989). 
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undialectical Marxist sociology.33  On this basis, Bukharin, understandably, has 
served many a scholar of Gramsci as a useful foil to illustrate the sophisticated 
quality of the Italian’s Marxism.34  But this, I would argue, has obscured the extent to 
which Gramsci’s ideas were framed by, and developed in an engagement with 
Bukharin’s work.  What is particularly perplexing in the current literature is the 
virtual absence of any explanation of the relationship between Bukharin’s extensive 
reliance on equilibrium in the Popular Manual - with chapters on ‘The Equilibrium 
between Society and Nature,’ ‘The Equilibrium between the Elements of Society,’ 
and ‘Disturbance and Readjustment of Social Equilibrium’ - and Gramsci’s own use 
of this concept.35  In fact, Bukharin’s work forms another important part of the 
backdrop of Gramsci’s development of ideas of balance and equilibrium.  
Particularly important here were his identification of equilibrium with 
interdependent holistic development of all the social spheres and especially his 
conception of ideological equilibrium - to which I now turn. 
                                                 
33 See, in particular, Notebooks 4, 7 and 8 in A. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Vol.II, ed. and transl.  J. 
A. Buttigieg  (New York, 1996), pp.137-264; A. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Vol. III, ed. and transl. 
J. A. Buttigieg, (New York, 2007), pp.153-383. 
34 See, for example, Bellamy and Schecter, Gramsci and the Italian State (Manchester, 1993), pp.85-
90; C. Boggs, Gramsci’s Marxism (London, 1976), pp.23-30; C. Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the 
State (London, 1980), pp.199-236; Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought, pp.66-81; J.Martin, 
Gramsci’s Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke, 1998), pp.77-79. 
35 A. Bukharin, Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology (London, 1926).  The subtitle of the 
book in Russian and in Gramsci’s own French copy was ‘A Popular Manual of Marxist Sociology’ 
which is why he consistently referred to it as the ‘Popular Manual.’  J.A. Buttigieg, ‘Notes’, in A. 
Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Vol.I, p.520. 
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It was in fact in Bukharin’s Popular Manual that Gramsci encountered for the first 
time an account of equilibrium that analysed society as a system in which each of its 
spheres – economic, political and ideological – were interdependent and functioned 
in perfect coordination when healthy.  While this notion was obviously partly 
inspired by Taylorism, it is becoming increasingly evident that Bogdanov’s 
organizational and embryonic systems theory had also a strong influence on such 
thinking among the theorists of the Russian Revolution and Bukharin in particular.36  
Indeed, in the Popular Manual, the presence of Bogdanov is equal to that of Marx, as 
Bukharin virtually reproduces his systems approach in maintaining that ‘human 
society …may be considered as a whole consisting of parts (elements) related with 
each other; in other words, this whole may be regarded as a system.’37  Bogdanov’s 
mechanical configuration of dialectics is also in evidence38 – as it had been in 
Trotsky – with Bukharin identifying the dialectic with ‘constant internal 
contradictions’ and a ‘clash of forces’ that can lead to: a ‘reestablishment of 
equilibrium on the former basis’ (‘stable equilibrium’); a reestablishment ‘on a new 
and “higher” basis ...on which society will increase and develop’ (‘unstable 
equilibrium with positive (favourable) indication’); and a reestablishment on a 
                                                 
36 John Biggart thus argues that ‘the extent of Bogdanov’s influence upon Soviet intellectual life 
during the 1920s is only now being realized.’ J. Biggart, ‘Bukharin’s Theory of Cultural Revolution’, 
in The Ideas of Nikolai Bukharin, ed. A.Kemp-Welch (Oxford, 1992), pp.131-2. 
37 Bukharin, Historical Materialism, p.75. 
38 A. Belykh, ‘Bogdanov’s Tektology and Economic Theory’, in Alexander Bogdanov and the Origins 
of Systems Thinking in Russia, eds. J. Biggart, P.Dudley and F. King (Aldershot, 1998), pp.144-145. 
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“lower” basis  …with ‘the extinction of a portion of this system’ (‘Unstable 
equilibrium with negative indication’).39  Although Gramsci would later describe this 
conception of dialectics inspired by Bogdanov and the natural sciences as ‘flat  
vulgar …evolutionalism,’40 the notions of interdependence and expansion and 
contraction that it entailed would nonetheless be taken up and developed in his 
theory of hegemony. 
 
But even more important than these conceptions of holism, interdependence and 
contraction and expansion was the explicit inclusion of an ‘ideological equilibrium’ 
within the social system in Bukharin’s approach.  Starting from the contention that in 
a healthy reproductive society a stable equilibrium must exist between production 
and the natural environment,41 Bukharin argued, that so too ‘if society as a whole is 
to endure, there must exist within it a certain condition of equilibrium (though it be 
unstable) between the material work as a whole and the superstructural work as a 
whole.’  For Bukharin this additional support for the social order would require a 
cadre of class-based ideological functionaries to organize it with ‘a certain 
proportionality’ in ‘the distribution of labour within the superstructure’ and within 
‘the branches of ideological work in particular.’  Their task would be to ‘mould the 
minds of the people’ on the model of Taylorized American capitalism by means of 
                                                 
39 Bukharin, Historical Materialism, pp.72-77.  The latter coincided with Trotsky’s above analysis of 
capitalist decline. 
40 A.Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and transl. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith 
(London, 2003), p.437. 
41 Bukharin, Historical Materialism, pp.104-129. 
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the press and the education system.42  Bukharin, however, did not see this process as 
a simple imposition or indoctrination of proletarian ideology de novo, but rather an 
organized rationalization of the extant ‘social psychology’ (‘little systematized 
feelings, thoughts and moods found in the given society, class, group, profession 
etc.’) which would be critically ‘systematized’ and ‘coordinated’ into a ‘social 
ideology’ (‘the system of thoughts, feelings, or rules of conduct (norms)’ including 
‘art’ ‘customs’ and ‘morals’) and ‘serve as rivets to hold together the existing order’ 
and ‘girders to maintain the equilibrium of the entire social body.’43 
 
Now while the ahistorical and abstractly systematized character of this conception of 
ideological equilibrium will come as no surprise to readers of Gramsci, what perhaps 
will be more noteworthy is the value that is accorded to both human will 
(organization) and ideology in these arguments raised by Bukharin.  The problem, of 
course, was that they were consistently contradicted and undermined throughout his 
Popular Manual by recourse to a much more prominent economic and materialistic 
determinism that the author seemed incapable of recognising.44  In the deluge of 
criticism aimed at Bukharin in the Prison Notebooks, it is not surprising that 
Gramsci’s acquisition and development of his ideas on equilibrium have gone 
unnoticed.  This development, however, only became possible after Piero Sraffa 
                                                 
42 Ibid, pp.219-221. 
43 Ibid, pp.208-209/215/255-6. 
44 Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought, pp.66-81. 
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directed Gramsci towards more sophisticated theories of equilibrium in neo-classical 
economics to which I now turn. 
 
Sraffa and Competitive-Compromise Equilibrium in Neo-classical Economics  
 
The influence of the Italian-born Cambridge economist, Piero Sraffa, on Gramsci has 
remained – like his Russian experience – one of the more enigmatic areas in Gramsci 
studies.  Although it has long been recorded that Sraffa was one of Gramsci’s chief 
aids during his prison years and the two men had engaged in some covert - if 
relatively minor - intellectual exchanges on the subjects of Ricardian economics and 
Benedetto Croce during his years in prison,45 the possibility of an earlier Sraffian 
influence on Gramsci’s intellectual development has begun to intrigue.  In particular, 
at least one leading Gramsci scholar and an editor of virtually all of his work – 
Valentino Gerratana – has argued that Sraffa played a significant role in encouraging 
Gramsci to rethink Party strategy in the mid-1920s.46  More recently their close 
personal and intellectual relationship between 1923 and 1926 - before Gramsci’s 
arrest and imprisonment and especially after his return to Italy in May 1924 to take 
his seat as a PCI deputy - has given the Gramsci-Sraffa nexus new impetus.47  In 
what follows I argue that the impact of Sraffa on the development of Gramsci’s 
                                                 
45 See A. Gramsci, Letters from Prison. Vol.I1, ed. F. Rosengarten and transl. R. Rosenthal (New 
York, 1994), pp.162-82; A. Gramsci and T. Schucht, Lettere 1926-1935 (Torino, 1997), pp.970-1024. 
46 V. Gerratana, ‘Introduzione’, in P. Sraffa, Lettere a Tania per Gramsci (Rome, 1991), pp.xvi-xxi. 
47 N. Naldi, ‘The Friendship between Piero Sraffa and Antonio Gramsci in the years 1919-1927’,  
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 7:1,  (2000), pp.79-114. 
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thought had more of an indirect character.  For although we have little evidence of 
the nature of the discussions that took place between them in the years before and 
after his imprisonment,48 what we can be sure of is that it was through Sraffa that 
Gramsci developed a critical interest in neo-classical economics during his early 
years in prison and especially the work of two of its major exponents: Maffeo 
Pantaleoni and Alfred Marshall.49  In what follows I highlight the usage of a 
conception of competitive-compromise equilibrium in their work and show how these  
neo-classical economists married it to the functional conception of equilibrium that 
Gramsci was already familiar with (Taylorism) in their theories of production and the 
competitive firm.  The confrontation with these ideas was, I believe, a further crucial 
staging-post in Gramsci’s acquisition and development of the language of balance 
and equilibrium in his theory of hegemony.50 
                                                 
48 See, however, Sraffa’s unsigned letter to the new edition of L’Ordine Nuovo calling for a 
‘democratic opposition’ to fascism with the cooperation of the PCI and Gramsci’s negative, yet 
thoughtful, reply. A. Gramsci and P. Sraffa, ‘Problems of Today and Tomorrow’, in Gramsci, 
Selections from Political Writings 1921-1926, pp.229-236. 
49 Gramsci wrote to Sraffa just two months after his arrest asking him to send him some books and 
especially a ‘good treatise on economics and finance for my studies.’  Shortly afterwards, he received 
a ‘package of books’ from Sraffa.  The package most likely included Marshall’s Principles of 
Economics (1925) and Pantaleoni’s Pure Economics (1931).  See, Gramsci, Letters from Prison: 
Vol.I, ed. F. Rosengarten and transl. R. Rosenthal (New York, 1994), pp.44-45/50.     
50 For discussions of these two conceptions of equilibrium in the context of political constitutionalism 
which have partly informed this article, see R. Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican 
Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy  (Cambridge, 2007), pp.195-208;  D. Wooton,  
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Although competitive-compromise equilibrium in neo-classical economics was a 
much more complicated affair than in classical economics, it should nonetheless be 
noted from the outset that it owed its origins to the same fundamental economic 
principle that the latter had first ‘discovered’: namely, the idea of homo 
oeconomicus.  As the Prison Notebooks confirm, Gramsci was clearly intrigued by 
this abstract account of universal competitive man,51 and especially as it appeared in 
Pantaleoni’s work where a ‘pure’ economic theory was erected on the ‘hedonic 
principle’ that ‘men are actuated in the production, consumption, distribution and 
circulation of wealth, exclusively by the desire to obtain the maximum satisfaction of 
their wants that circumstances admit of, with the least possible individual 
sacrifice.’52  The neo-classics in fact claimed that the conditions of competition that 
followed from this simple principle would result in a mutually beneficial 
compromise equilibrium.  The strength, however, of their approach over the classical 
economists resided in the novel concept of ‘marginal utility’ which provided a much 
more coherent and sophisticated account of how such compromises were reached.  In 
Pantaleoni’s abstract economic model, for example, marginal utility (‘the final 
degree of utility’) was closely associated with the Ricardian theory of ‘comparative 
costs’ as he argued that the primary condition for an exchange between two parties 
                                                                                                                                          
‘Liberty,   Metaphor   and Mechanism: “Checks and Balances” and the Origins of Modern 
Constitutionalism’, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/download/seminars/0203/22Check_Bal.doc 
51 A. Gramsci, Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London, 1995), ed. D. Boothman, 
pp.170-173. 
52 M. Pantaleoni, Pure Economics (London, 1898), p.9. 
 22 
was ‘a difference in the comparative degrees of final utility of the commodities to be 
exchanged.’53  That is to say, that each party would assess subjectively the utility 
they attributed to the final unit of a particular commodity they possessed in 
comparison with a unit of a commodity possessed by some other party, weighing up 
the costs and benefits of any exchange.  For Pantaleoni, ‘if both are perfect 
hedonists’ then the ‘equilibrium price’ resulting from the exchange gives ‘both 
parties equal gain in terms of utility’ and ‘the strain is equal on both sides.’  
Although he recognized that there would always be a degree of ‘arbitrariness’ in the 
rate of exchange and that there would only be a tendency towards equilibrium,54 his 
Pure Economics nevertheless generalized the logics of ‘marginal utility’ and 
‘comparative costs’ across the different sectors of the economy envisaging a 
situation in which competition and compromise reigned side by side with exchange 
relations gravitating towards perfect proportionality between effective supply and 
demand.55 
 
Now what is important to grasp about theories of equilibrium of this nature is that 
they deliberately imply that a kind of benevolence is at work in a competitive ‘free 
market’ facilitating the increase of wealth and economic efficiency.  However, by the 
early twentieth century the sun was clearly setting on the era of laissez-faire 
capitalism and its internal benevolence, and even the neo-classical ‘pure’ economics 
                                                 
53 Pantaleoni, Pure Economics, pp.142/145.  Pantaleoni in fact claimed that the theories of marginal 
utility and Ricardo’s comparative costs were ‘substantially identical.’  Ibid, p.143.  
54 Ibid, p.142-6. 
55 See Pantaleoni, ‘Chapter 3: The Law of Demand and Supply’, in Pure Economics, pp.164-209. 
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of Pantaleoni did not remain impervious to the huge influence of planning and 
organization that the Second Industrial Revolution and Fordism in particular had 
demonstrated in modern industry.  It was in this context, that a functionalist 
conception of equilibrium increasingly began to find its way into economic theory, 
and particularly its account of the entrepreneur and his organizational role of 
combining and balancing the factors of production in the competitive firm where the 
two conceptions of equilibrium actually co-existed dynamically.  While there is no 
space here to expand on Marshall’s extensive writings on production and the 
equilibrium of the ‘representative firm’ – or indeed Sraffa’s critique of his position 
which marked his spectacular entrance into the field of economic theory56 – it will 
suffice for my purposes to make two key points about Marshall and Pantaleoni’s 
conception of the balancing of the factors of production in industry that would later 
be taken up by Gramsci.  Firstly, in both cases the equilibrium of the firm is 
associated with a centralized human organizational power (entrepreneurial 
management) that is responsible for coordination and harmony between the various 
factors in competitive circumstances where – theoretically at least – any agent can 
assert its autonomy by withdrawing its labour, capital etc. to employ elsewhere 
should more favourable conditions of contract become available.57  Although 
Marshall’s work provided the most comprehensive account of the equilibrium of the 
                                                 
56 See, P. Sraffa, ‘Sulle Relazioni fra Costo e Quantita Prodotta’, Annali di Economia, 2 (1925), 
pp.277-328; P. Sraffa, ‘The Laws of Returns under Competitive Conditions’, Economic Journal, 36 
(1926), pp.535-550. 
57 A. Marshall, Principles of Economics (London, 1947, Eighth Edition), pp.138-322; Pantaleoni, 
Pure Economics, pp.278-283/305-307.       
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firm, it was Pantaleoni who found the most appealing means of illuminating this 
process of balancing factors for Gramsci through his notion of the ‘law of definite 
proportions’ (legge delle proporzioni definite).  In Pantaleoni’s Pure Economics the 
factors of production are thus equated with complementary and instrumental 
commodities which we are told are just like chemical compounds that will combine 
‘only in definite proportions.’58  Clearly linking this notion with the wider 
responsibilities of the entrepreneur in the division of labour, he claimed that ‘only a 
determinate number of workers, given the quality of their work, can be combined 
with a determinate quantity of capital to produce the maximum degree of 
efficiency,’59 and indeed, ‘any quantity of a commodity in excess of the proportion in 
which nature, or any technical art, can combine it with a determinate quantity of 
other complementary commodities present is useless or noxious as regards the 
economic result.’60  The second major point to be made about such neo-classical 
theories of production was accordingly that for theorists like Pantaleoni and Marshall  
the industrial entrepreneur was confronted with a complex task of achieving 
functional and compromise equilibrium at the margin in conditions were force – in 
its overtly coercive sense - was not an option.  These were ideas that were for 
Gramsci pregnant with political as well as economic significance, as he would 
demonstrate in his development of their logic in his theory of hegemony in the 
Prison Notebooks, to which I now turn. 
                                                 
58 Pantaleoni, Pure Economics, pp.82-85/251. 
59 Ibid, p.256. 





Revisiting Functional Equilibrium in the Party’s Division of Labour 
 
If there is one area in which notions of balance and equilibrium have been accorded 
at least some attention in the current literature on Gramsci’s political thought, it is in 
relation to his account of the proper organizational strategy of the revolutionary party 
and its intellectual cadres where Gramsci actually quotes Pantaleoni’s ‘theorem of 
definite proportions.’  While Joseph Femia has found the concept to be of little 
‘operational value’ due to its circularity (‘‘equilibrium’ is a precondition of 
‘effectiveness’; but the sole criterion for determining ‘equilibrium’ is 
‘effectiveness’),61 A.R. Buzzi reduces the notion of ‘definite proportions’ to one of 
numerical and optimal proportioning of mass between three levels in the Party 
hierarchy using the image of a pyramid to capture the idea.62  Since I intend to argue 
for a much more extensive use of notions of balance and equilibrium in Gramsci’s 
theory of hegemony by illustrating how they were developed from the sources I have 
examined in the first part of this article, it seems appropriate for me to begin my 
discussion on the same terrain as these commentators with the agents of hegemony: 
the Party and its intellectuals.  In this section, I therefore begin my discussion on 
Gramsci by demonstrating the presence of a reconstructed Taylorism in his 
                                                 
61 Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought, pp.153-154. 
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organizational theory of the Party and the intellectuals which he identifies as a kind 
of functional equilibrium.  I pursue this argument by showing how the technical 
requirements of equilibrium informed, firstly, his attitude to the specialized training 
of different cadres of ‘organic intellectuals’ by the Party; secondly, his vision of the 
Party levels as interdependent and proportionally optimized in terms of both their 
mass and competencies; and finally, his strong endorsement of democratic structures 
in the Party which was also defended primarily on technical and functional grounds.  
All of the former were for Gramsci essential preparation in the battle for hegemony. 
 
Although Gramsci’s category of ‘organic intellectuals’ has led many commentators 
to rightly emphasize his insistence on their embedded position in class relations and 
the crucial mediating role they played between the masses and political institutions,63 
this has sometimes overshadowed the extent to which Gramsci in the Prison 
Notebooks ‘actually defines the organic intellectuals in terms of organisational 
activity and technical specialisation.’64  It is here of course where the Italian’s 
renewed interest in the organizational principles of Taylorism is especially evident, 
particularly as he now proposes that the Party (i.e. the revolutionary party) must 
develop different cadres of intellectuals specialized to take over the tasks of the 
capitalist in all three spheres of production, politics and civil society.  Gramsci, in 
fact, in elaborating his theory of the Party intellectuals proposes a functional division 
of labour in line with these categories, with a cadre of economic intellectuals 
                                                 
63 See, for example, Martin, Gramsci’s Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction, pp.44-47. 
64 Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci’s Politics, p.139. 
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responsible for ‘organizing the social hegemony of a group,’ another for organizing 
the ‘domination of the state’ and yet another responsible for organizing ‘the consent 
that comes from the prestige attached to the function in the world of production.’65  
For Gramsci this specialization of socialist ‘organic intellectuals’ would commence 
in civil society around the Party newspaper or periodical with an intellectual elite 
developing a programme for producing cadres of ‘specialized functionaries.’66  The 
programme would, according to Gramsci, eventually turn out ‘intellectuals who are 
well-trained to engage in regular publishing activities’ with the Party elite setting 
‘criteria and ideas concerning the assignment of further work and its distribution 
among the entire personnel, in such a way as to induce the individual members to 
specialize and create for themselves the conditions of specialization.’  ‘The method 
of work,’ he continued, ‘should be strict and rigorous’ with each new group member 
even being assigned a mentor ‘helping him to work and to develop for himself a 
working discipline, a method of production that would “Taylorize” him 
intellectually, so to speak.’67 
 
If Gramsci’s plans for the effective training of Party intellectuals thus reproduced the 
Taylorite organizational principles of functional equilibrium in its emphasis on 
‘specialization’ in the division of labour, it did likewise when Gramsci turned to the 
relations between the Party’s hierarchical levels.  However, contrary to what Femia 
                                                 
65 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Vol.II, pp.200-201.  Gramsci recognised a similar division of labour 
among the intellectuals of capitalist hegemony.  Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere: Vol.III, p.2041.    
66 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, pp.28-29. 
67 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Volume II, pp.209-210.  
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and Buzzi have argued, for Gramsci the development of an equilibrium in these 
relations is not simply a question of numerical proportioning of mass or the vague 
notion of ‘effectiveness,’ but rather, a question of the efficient organization and 
coordination of the functions of each hierarchical tier of a specific party, in a specific 
historical context, to meet specific objectives.  Just as every economic system has ‘its 
own law of determinate proportions [my italics]’ and ‘its own “optimum” 
equilibrium’ in its internal relations,68 so too, Gramsci argued, must the political 
party seek to attain a similar equilibrium in the relations between its various 
hierarchical tiers.  It is clear, moreover, that the specific party that Gramsci has in 
mind is the PCd’I which had a particular goal and strategy – the United Front.  If 
one might concur with Femia that Gramsci does not give us precise criteria for the 
functions to be carried out at each party level in the passage on Pantaleoni’s theorem, 
he does - as Femia himself recognises - in other parts of the Prison Notebooks 
identify at least some criteria to be applied to a rejuvenated Communist Party.  The 
highest level of the Party (the central executive) is accordingly identified as ‘the 
principle cohesive element’ endowed with ‘great cohesive, centralizing, disciplinary 
…innovative powers’; ‘the intermediate element’ is responsible for maintaining not 
only ‘physical’ but also ‘moral and intellectual’ contact between the leaders and led; 
while the mass element’s role ‘takes the form of discipline and loyalty.’69  It is 
precisely these ‘qualities’ or functional criteria that I would argue that Gramsci had 
in mind in taking up Pantaleoni’s conception of equilibrium as a ‘law of definite 
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proportions.’  Indeed, this becomes obvious if we consider the dynamic and 
expansive re-articulation to which Gramsci subjects Pantaleoni’s theorem - 
reminiscent of Trotsky and Bukharin – bringing it into line with the dialectical and 
mass-building character of the United Front strategy.  For Gramsci anticipates that as 
the Party built up its mass base, in order to maintain its equilibrium as a truly 
revolutionary party it would also be required to elaborate both qualitatively and 
quantitively its two higher levels to adequately protect itself from the kind of 
‘liquidationist’ ‘corrupting’ tendencies that had so exercised the PCd’I in its early 
years.70 It is for precisely this reason that Gramsci is careful to insist that in the 
‘relations between the various arms and corps…Each change in a single part 
necessitates a new equilibrium with the whole.’71   
 
We should not, however, assume that for Gramsci the Party would therefore be 
divided into closed hierarchical functional segments.  Indeed, he considered that one 
of the strengths of the modern capitalist state - which the Party would replace - was 
that it had abandoned this organization pattern typical of the classical and medieval 
state with its ‘mechanical bloc of social groups …with separate functions.’72  If the 
Party was to act effectively, Gramsci maintained, it too must act collectively (as a 
‘collective intellectual’) to achieve its objectives and for Gramsci this could only be 
assured through the development of adequate democratic structures in the Party 
                                                 
70 See P. Spriano, ‘10. Il Dissenso con il Komintern’ in Storia del partito communista italiano: Da 
Bordiga a Gramsc, Vol 1 (Torino, 1967). 
71 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, pp.190-192. 
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which would nurture and preserve coordination and close responsive relations 
between all of its parts.  Thus, in his prison writings Gramsci’s endorsement of 
Leninist centralization and discipline is offset by a reconfigured ‘democratic 
centralism’ marked by ‘continual adaptation’ between levels where ‘orders from 
above’ are now counterpoised by ‘thrusts from below’ and the necessity for ‘a 
continuous insertion of elements thrown up from the depths of the rank and file into 
the solid framework of the leadership.’73  Although, it should be acknowledged that 
Gramsci failed to explicate in any detail how these democratic structures would be 
organised and preserved, their importance should not be under-stated since they 
formed his one major bulwark against what he regarded as the most significant 
problem of disequilibrium in the Party organisational structure: the bureaucratization 
and isolation of the leadership.74  When this happens, Gramsci claimed, ‘the party 
ends up by becoming anachronistic and at moments of acute crisis it is voided of its 
social content and left as though suspended in mid-air.’75  Democratic structures thus 
played a major technical role in preserving vitality and equilibrium between each 
level of the Party.  In fact, Gramsci’s emphasis on interdependence and functional 
equilibrium was a recurring theme in the Prison Notebooks, as the next section on 
Gramsci’s rethinking of the Party’s revolutionary strategy clearly demonstrates. 
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The Dialectics of Equilibrium in the Revolutionary Process 
 
While it has long been fashionable to distinguish sharply between Gramsci and the 
theorists of the Russian Revolution, my approach here is to give Trotsky and 
Bukharin their due, exploring how Gramsci borrowed as well as developed their 
ideas.  This, of course, is to take up again my original argument that returning 
Gramsci to his proper historical context is as much a task of placing him within the 
Marxist tradition of his day as it is of elucidating the specifically Italian quality of his 
thought.76  In what follows I demonstrate the significant influence of Trotsky and 
Bukharin’s ideas of interdependence between levels, dialectics and coordination on 
Gramsci’s account of disequilibrium and re-equilibrium in the revolutionary process, 
and I focus in particular on how Gramsci built on their work, developing a more 
historically sensitive, ideologically centred and humanist account of equilibrium. 
 
Trotsky, it will be recalled, maintained that there was a relationship of 
interdependence between the economic structure and the politics of the Western 
capitalist state, and it was the latter which had been successfully manipulated 
through a mixture of coercive and concessionary measures to re-stabilize capitalism 
in the era of the post-War crisis.  Gramsci in fact elaborated this conception of a 
relationship of functional interdependence between levels in the capitalist state, but 
in contrast to Trotsky, he argued that it was not primarily the political state that was 
                                                 
76 For explorations of Gramsci’s thought in the context of his Marxist contemporaries see, Anderson, 
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providing the crucial support for capitalist stability in the era of economic crisis, but 
civil society, where the ideology of the bourgeoisie was dominant at a deeper 
‘organic’ and more spontaneous level.  This was a significant shift in the Italian’s 
thinking who just prior to his incarceration in a report to the PCd’I Executive in 
August 1926 had virtually reproduced Trotsky’s account of capitalist equilibrium in 
the era of crisis.  Referring to the ‘period of so-called stabilization [my italics],’ 
Gramsci thus observed that ‘in the advanced capitalist countries …politics always 
lags behind economics’ and ‘even the most serious economic crises do not have 
immediate repercussions in the political sphere’ since ‘the ruling class possesses 
political and organizational reserves which it did not possess, for instance, in 
Russia.’77  In the Prison Notebooks, however, Gramsci moves beyond this position to 
remonstrate with Trotsky for his over-reliance on the state as equilibrator, attacking 
his 1921 plans to use its coercive apparatus to carry out a militarization and 
Taylorization of labour in Russian industry to right the ‘imbalance between theory 
and practice’ as an initiative that ‘would have ended up, necessarily, in a form of 
Bonapartism.’  For Gramsci, this reflected Trotsky’s inability to apprehend that the 
stability of the crisis-ridden capitalist mode of production was not primarily 
dependent on the state but on civil society.  It is no coincidence then that immediately 
following his reflections on this failed attempt by Trotsky to stabilize Russian 
industry through coercion, Gramsci points out the success of Fordism’s ideological 
strategy of using its financial weight and influence in American civil society to bring 
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the ‘way of life’ into line with production by promoting ‘puritanical’ initiatives such 
as campaigns against alcohol and sexual promiscuity.  Such initiatives, he tells us, 
helped to ‘preserve a psycho-physical equilibrium outside the place of work in order 
to prevent the new method from leading to the physiological collapse of the 
worker.’78  The equilibrium of Fordist capitalism was therefore more dependent on 
ideological persuasion in civil society than state coercion or concessions, and what is 
particularly to be noted is the historical character that Gramsci had now inscribed in 
the concept.  For the ‘puritanical’ nature of these initiatives was an obvious reference 
to the strong Puritan and Calvinist religious traditions in the United States, showing 
that the ideological strategy of Fordism had been carefully attuned to its national 
environment.79   
 
This new assessment of the equilibrium of advanced capitalism and its reliance 
primarily on ideology and civil society obviously had implications for Gramsci’s 
conception of the revolutionary process that again set his approach apart from 
Trotsky.  The Gramsci of the Prison Notebooks now in fact argued that it was crucial 
to begin the revolution from ‘within’ the consciousness of the workers in order to 
undermine capitalist equilibrium, while at the same time developing the ‘producer’ 
mentality that would form the bedrock of a new proletarian order.  The strategy was 
therefore one of disequilibrating the capitalist state by denying it of its ideological 
defences in civil society which would leave it ‘isolated’ and totally dependent on a 
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dysfunctional economic structure and state coercion – ideal revolutionary conditions.  
It was here of course that an optimally functioning party of specialized intellectuals 
would prove vital.  For Gramsci never relented in his insistence that all workers 
beyond their professional activities had an intellectual life and sustained a particular 
‘conception of the world’ in civil society, and it was precisely in this sphere where 
the former would have to engage in an ideological struggle to dislodge and 
disintegrate the stabilizing consent that capitalism had managed to manufacture.  In 
theorizing the transition in this way, it should be noted, that Gramsci not only turned 
once again to the language of balance, but also borrowed Trotsky’s conception of the 
inverse development of proletarian and capitalist equilibrium, with the former 
actually emerging out of the latter in a dialectical process of disequilibrium and re-
equilibrium.  The undermining of Fordist ideological strategies among the workers 
would therefore involve a gradual ‘critical elaboration of the intellectual activity that 
exists in everyone at a certain degree of development, modifying its relationship with 
the muscular-nervous effort towards a new equilibrium, and ensuring that the 
muscular-nervous effort itself; in so far as it is an element of a general practical 
activity, which is perpetually innovating the physical and social world [i.e. labour], 
becomes the foundation of a new and integral conception of the world.’80  Before this 
new and ‘integral’ proletarian order could emerge, however, Gramsci recognised that 
a period of chronic instability in the capitalist order (an ‘organic crisis’) would have 
to be traversed.  Indeed, he even related the advent of fascism to a dangerous point in 
the transition process when capitalist and socialist blocs were equally matched, 
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describing this as a ‘static’ or ‘catastrophic’ ‘equilibrium’ in which ‘forces whose 
opposition is historically incurable’ cannot ‘fuse and unite’ to form ‘an organic 
equilibrium’ thus providing the conditions ‘from which Caesarism is born (can be 
born).’81  As the correction in parenthesis suggests, for Gramsci everything – both 
the further contraction of capitalist equilibrium and the expansion of socialist 
equilibrium - would depend now on human will and the ability of the proletarian 
forces to organize effectively.82  In viewing this organization as primarily of an 
ideological nature in civil society, Gramsci was however now moving more on the 
terrain of Bukharin rather than Trotsky. 
 
As we have seen, Bukharin tended to see the transition to socialism as a developing 
equilibrium between the superstructures and the economic base in which - in contrast 
to  capitalism’s economic anarchy – the two were fully and rationally coordinated.  
Gramsci did in fact pick up this idea from the Russian, but in sharp contrast to 
Bukharin’s mechanical and ahistorical economic determinism, Gramsci envisaged 
the process as occuring dialectically with the Party genuinely and effectively 
exercising its collective will to organize the new equilibrium in a specific historical 
setting which would be reflected in the resulting optimization of social relations.  
Machiavelli as ‘active politician’ represented the model for the Party to follow in this 
respect.  For ‘the active politician’ not only ‘bases himself on effective reality’ 
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recognising that society is not ‘static and immobile’ but ‘rather a relation of forces in 
continuous motion and shift of equilibrium,’ but also, he applies his will ‘to the 
creation of a new equilibrium among the forces which really exist and are operative - 
basing oneself on the particular force which one believes to be progressive and 
strengthening it to help it to victory.’83  If there can be little doubt then that 
Gramsci’s account of the developing equilibrium of the new socialist order was 
infused with a new voluntarist, historicist and dialectical character, it should 
nonetheless be recognised that he drew heavily on Bukharin in conceiving the 
transition as a process of ‘rationalization’ and ‘coordination’ between the base and 
superstructure.  In fact, Gramsci takes up the Russian’s idea of a ‘systematization’ of 
‘social psychology’ into ‘social ideology,’ thoroughly historicizing his approach and 
transcending Bukharin’s simplistic distinction between mutually exclusive ‘things 
and ideas,’ by conceiving the process as one in which socialist theory and practice 
are unified in an historically specific social setting.  This unity, moreover, would 
again progress dialectically, as Gramsci maintained that the ‘new culture’ of 
Marxism could only emerge with ‘the development of social relations ….a 
“combination” of old and new, a temporary equilibrium corresponding to the 
equilibrium in social relations.’84  Nothing captures more clearly both Gramsci’s 
reliance on Bukharin for the kernel of this idea, and the Italian’s insistence on 
developing it historically and dialectically than his reconfiguration in Notebook 8 and 
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Notebook 11 of Bukharin’s rationalization of civil society as the transformation of 
‘common sense’ into ‘good sense’ or ‘philosophy’ (i.e. Marxism as a popularly-
based philosophy of praxis).  Betraying the genesis of this idea, Gramsci thus 
maintained that ‘A work like the Popular Manual …should have as its point of 
departure an analysis and a critique of the philosophy of common sense’ whose 
‘disjointed, incoherent, and inconsequential conception of the world that matches the 
character of the multitudes’ should be transformed with the ‘formation of an 
homogenous social group’ into ‘a “homogenous – that is, systematic – philosophy, in 
opposition to common sense.’85  Given that ‘common sense’ was necessarily infused 
with the ideological historical remnants of the bourgeois order, it would be necessary 
to adopt ‘a polemical and critical guise’ to it, which for Gramsci – like Bukharin - 
was not a question of introducing ‘from scratch a scientific form of thought into 
everyone’s individual life’ but ‘renovating and making “critical” an already existing 
activity’ and progressing it ‘to the level of real possession of a single and coherent 
conception of the world.’  This in turn would bring ‘organisational stability’ of an 
‘organic quality’ to the new and developing proletarian order.86  The problem for 
Gramsci, however, was that in developing a conception of equilibrium that 
incorporated a historically specific and dialectical account of civil society he was 
now confronted with a much more diverse and complex challenge of organization 
and coordination than Bukharin.  Notions of functionalist equilibrium might seem 
feasible in a party or state where the realisation of an homogenous and disciplined 
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class consciousness was all that was required, but in conditions in which the goal 
was to recognise, integrate and organise diverse and historically specific ideological 
elements, additional problems arose in the ideological struggle in civil society that 
required Gramsci to turn to a new conception of equilibrium.   
 
Organizing Ideological Equilibrium as ‘the Hegemonic Function’ 
 
While the early Gramsci had emphatically rejected any notion of the Party exercising 
‘a balancing function’ between internal interests in favour of a class sectarianism on 
a par with Bordiga,87 the Gramsci of the Prison Notebooks now fully embraced a 
much broader conception of this idea as a necessary task in the battle for hegemony 
and consent in conditions of a fragmented civil society.  In this final section I argue 
that Gramsci in fact attempted to resolve the organizational and coordinating 
problems which inevitably came with embracing the plurality and partial autonomy 
of ideological elements in civil society by borrowing and building on ideas of 
balance and equilibrium from neo-classical economics and Fordism, and especially 
on the former’s conception of the dual competitive and functional equilibrium 
managed by the entrepreneur in production.  I focus in particular on how Gramsci 
reconfigured notions of leadership, compromise, coordination and even fusion 
borrowed from these sources to render his theory of ideological hegemony more 
persuasive and coherent. 
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Perhaps the most obvious clue that Gramsci conceives of hegemony as the exercising 
of a similar role as the capitalist-entrepreneur in the process of production is his 
insistence throughout the Prison Notebooks that the proletariat must abandon its 
‘economic-corporate’ phase and become a leading class (classe dirigente).  While 
Gramsci’s use of this term has correctly been seen as a means of distinguishing 
between ruling by consent (dirigere) and ruling by coercion (dominare),88 it seems to 
me that the term is also meant to suggest the acquisition by the proletariat of the 
same directional or managerial (direzione) tasks that were typical of the entrepreneur 
in production.  Included here of course was the willingness and capacity to negotiate 
compromise equilibria with the various suppliers of factors; an idea which Gramsci 
would by then have been totally familiar with through Pantaleoni and Marshall’s 
production theories.  Indeed, Gramsci’s famous ‘war of position’ was a recognition 
that like the entrepreneur a hegemonic proletariat would have to compete for the 
services of the subaltern groups and arrive at compromise equilibria with them in the 
interests of collective objectives and the further expansion of its hegemony among 
elements previously affiliated with the bourgeoisie.  The first stage of this process for 
Gramsci was accordingly the abandoning by the proletariat of its purely selfish 
‘economic-corporate’ phase which would open the way for such compromise and it 
is significant that he tellingly and explicitly linked this with equilibrium.  In one of 
his clearest definitions of the hegemonic process as the achievemnt of a compromise 
                                                 
88 See, for example, Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith, ‘Preface’, in Gramsci, Selections from the Prison 
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equilibrium between the leading group and subordiante groups Gramsci therefore 
declared: 
 
…the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and 
the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that 
a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed - in other words, that the 
leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind.89 
 
Indeed, the reluctance to compromise on the part of the leading group would be fatal, 
as Gramsci – like Trotsky – believed the balance and expansion of the proletarian 
forces was inversely related to the position of the capitalist bloc, and if the proletariat 
failed to make the necessary compromise and win the active consent of auxiliary 
groups, then these same forces would serve to sustain capitalist hegemony.90   
 
It was not, however, simply the notion of leading through compromise that linked 
Gramsci’s conception of equilibrium with the tasks of the entrepreneur of the 
competitive firm in balancing the factors of production.  As we have seen, under the 
influence of Fordist industrial developments, neo-classical theories of production had 
in fact moved beyond essentially competitive-compromise equilibrium to integrate 
its more functionalist dimensions.  Gramsci now picked up on this to suggest that the 
balancing between the groups in a hegemonic formation was not simply based on 
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bargained compromises, but also, the combining and coordination of the parties for 
collective ends and universal expansion.  This of course was typical of the 
production theories of neo-classical economics and the productivist ideology of 
Italian Fordism, and indeed, conceptions of progressive equilibrium in Bogdanov, 
Bukharin and Trotsky.  In a key passage in the Prison Notebooks Gramsci thus 
insists: 
 
..the development and expansion of the particular group are conceived of, and 
presented, as being the motor force of a universal expansion, of a development 
of all the “national” energies. In other words, the dominant group is 
coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups, and 
the life of the State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and 
superseding of unstable equilibria...91 
 
What is important to note, moreover, is that the compromise and combination 
envisaged had now taken on once again a more dialectical (note the above use of 
equilibria), historically grounded and ideological character than a mere bargain 
between abstract economically-motivated parties.  Gramsci, in fact, realised that an 
equilibrium of this nature – even if it could be reproduced in reality - would not 
provide the stability for a hegemonic alliance to advance effectively, and he therefore 
sought to situate his equilibrium at the deeper ‘organic’ level of ideology.  At this 
level, it was more a question of bonding than combining, and especially of fusing the 
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leading class with the national-popular ideological elements whose mass support 
would provide additional and vital stability.  Gramsci conceived this process as one 
where the Party and its mediating functionaries yet again played the central role, 
arguing that the ‘The political party …is responsible for welding together the organic 
intellectuals of a given group - the dominant one - and the traditional intellectuals.’92  
While this was an appropriate strategy in Western Europe, Gramsci’s sensitivity to 
historical context led him to insist on a different strategy for North America where 
‘The necessity of an equilibrium is determined, not by the need to fuse together the 
organic intellectuals with the traditional, but by the need to fuse together in a single 
national crucible with a unitary culture the different forms of culture imported by 
immigrants of differing national origins.’93   
 
Although the old habits of polemics, and the reluctance to abandon the utopian 
Marxist vision of a harmonious communist society led Gramsci to imply at times in 
the Prison Notebooks that hegemonic unity would approach the kind of functional 
equilibrium of a closed system,94 he could not escape the fact that the logic of 
embracing the notion of a competitive-compromise equilibrium in historically 
evolving conditions meant that - like the capitalist firm - the hegemonic bloc was 
constantly threatened by disintegration from external competition and assertions of  
autonomy.  Nothing illustrates this more clearly than Gramsci’s reliance on a 
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‘balancing function’ for the leading group which resonated strongly with the central 
role of the entrepreneur in the firm in Marshall’s neo-classical economics and 
especially Pantaleoni’s insistence that the entrepreneur’s role was one of combining 
factors ‘in definite proportions.’   This of course suggested – as in Marshall and 
Pantaleoni - that a centralized apparatus would be required to ‘proportion’ and 
‘check’ so that the weight given to each ideological element did not threaten the 
efficiency of the overall collective effort or provoke disintegrative antagonisms 
between the various parties.  Gramsci in fact incorporated such a role into his theory 
of hegemony, claiming that the fundamental class ‘balances the various interests 
struggling against the predominant (but not absolutely exclusivist) interest’ and is 
responsible for ‘holding the balance between the various interests in “civil society.”’   
It was again ‘the political party’ which would take up this task which was 
sufficiently vital as to be identified by Gramsci as ‘the hegemonic function’ 
(funzione egemonica e quindi equilibratrice).95  Indeed, in a move which further 
betrayed the origins of the idea Gramsci saw this role as  analogous to the position of 
the ‘Head of State’ in constitutional democracies or ‘the Crown’ in the then 
developing British Commonwealth whose function like the entrepreneur was one of 
attempting to reconcile the need for unity with the demands of autonomous 
elements.96  Although it should be acknowledged that Gramsci never arrived at a 
fully developed conception of this balancing function of the hegemonic class in   
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conditions of ideological plurality and competition, he did however offer two 
tantalizing suggestions of how autonomy could be checked and the siphoning of 
support by competitors averted. 
 
Checking for Gramsci would appear to have been a case of educating and criticizing 
the potentially disintegrative elements.  Thus he envisaged the development of 
socialist hegemony out of the capitalist order as a process in which ‘the first 
representatives of the new historical phase’ conduct a ‘criticism’ of these elements 
that ‘results in a process of differentiation and of change in the relative weight that 
the adherents of the old ideologies used to possess.’  For Gramsci, this was not 
simply a question of blocking the development of certain elements that had 
previously been allied to capitalism, but rather a process of mutual redefinition 
which would occur as the new elements were bonded and coordinated ever more 
closely with the proletarian centre.  Consequently, for these rearticulated elements 
‘What was once considered secondary and subordinate, or even incidental, comes to 
be seen as primary and becomes the nucleus of a new ideological and theoretical 
complex.’97  Indeed, it was precisely in the process of the re-integration of these 
dislodged ideological elements that Gramsci believed that the threat of siphoning  
from hegemonic competitors could be averted.  For if the new relations were to be 
enduring the progressive element (‘the element of stability’) would have to take up 
its leading role and fuse the subaltern forces (‘which, though related and allied, are 
                                                 
97 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks: Volume III, pp.346-347. 
 45 
heterogeneous and wavering’)98 into an ideological ‘collective will.’  Gramsci  
maintained that this alone would guarantee revolutionary success.  ‘An historical 
act,’ he thus claimed: 
 
…can only be performed by “collective man,” and this presupposes the 
attainment of a “cultural-social” unity through which a multiplicity of 
dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single 
aim, on the basis of an equal and common conception of the world, both 
general and particular…99    
 
However, as the above makes patently obvious, equilibrium in civil society had now 
become the site of a tension between ‘unity’ and ‘autonomy,’ ‘singularity’ and 
‘heterogeneity,’ the ‘general’ and the ‘particular.’100  And it was Gramsci’s intuition 
of the inability to escape this tension in the wider competition for hegemony that 
explains his excessive reliance on the language of ‘binding’ (legare, collegare), 
‘fusing’ (fondere) and ‘welding’ (saldare) that so marked his later thought.  If he 
more often than not suggested in the Prison Notebooks that socialist hegemony 
would approach the closed ‘organic’ unity of a living organism, we should at least 
recognise that this was at times offset with a more realistic account of the unity of a 
hegemonic bloc identified with the concept of equilibrium.  In my view, it is the 
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latter which seems more consonant with the historical, dialectical and democratic 
character of hegemony that Gramsci is at pains to emphasize in other parts of the 
Prison Notebooks.  In fact, in the concluding remarks of this article I want to go 
further and suggest that my analysis of the origins and use of the language of balance 
and equilibrium in Gramsci’s prison writings has important implications for how his 
theory of hegemony is interpreted, and indeed, how it might be applied and 
developed for contemporary political and ideological analysis.             
 
Conclusion: Hegemony and Equilibrium 
 
One key conclusion which can be drawn from the above discussion is that for 
Gramsci hegemony was as much an effective organizational strategy as a 
philosophical argument about the nature of the political world.  Equilibrium was in 
fact attained through a collective effort of human will - rather than deterministic laws 
or benevolent competition – and it is precisely for this reason that Gramsci 
consistently yoked his theory of hegemony throughout the Prison Notebooks to the 
Party and the intellectuals.  It seems to me that it is time to reassert this emphasis on 
organization and the mediation of power in Gramsci’s hegemony that his 
development - if not inversion - of the concept of equilibrium as he found it so 
clearly demonstrates.  This, I believe, is especially appropriate in a context in which 
current poststructuralist applications of hegemony appear too fixated with highly 
generalized philosophical arguments at the expense of political agency and the actual 
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processes through which hegemonic formations are concretized.101  I do not of 
course wish to suggest that the application of Gramsci’s hegemony should now be 
accompanied by a quest for the kind of rigid and uncompromising organizational 
strategies of Taylorism or Leninism (which, as we have seen, Gramsci did not 
espouse).  Rather, it is more a question of insisting on the methodological principle 
that part of the explanation of hegemonic formations must include an adequate 
account of the central mediating agencies of organization, coordination and balance 
without which it is in my view impossible to maintain the coherence of the theory.              
 
A second important conclusion of this article is that Gramsci’s hegemony should be 
firmly situated within the holistic Marxist ontology from which it emerged.  This, I 
believe, is not only to remain more faithful to the emphasis on interdependence and 
coordination between levels that Gramsci’s use of the concept of equilibrium so 
clearly illustrates, but also, to avoid the inevitable contradictions or ‘antinomies’ that 
ensue with any effort to confine Gramsci’s hegemony to the realm of civil society and 
ideology which have been well-documented and are, it must be acknowledged, 
largely of the Italian’s own making.102  ‘Ideologism’ of this nature was inspired by 
what now seem anachronistic efforts to disassociate Gramsci from the twin ‘evils’ of 
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the economic determinism of Second International Marxism (Plekhanov, Kautsky) 
and the obsessive statism of Third Internationalists (Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin), and I 
need hardly add that my endorsement of a more holistic approach to hegemony is by 
no means an attempt to return to these outdated canons.  On the contrary, what 
Gramsci’s recourse to the language of balance and equilibrium reinforces is the 
reciprocal relationship between levels of society that necessarily involves the 
abandonment of simplistic notions of determinism of any kind.  Indeed, in my view 
the development of the concept of equilibrium offers further hope of rescuing 
Gramsci’s hegemony from all determinisms - including the Italian’s own residual 
economism103 - but especially from the aforementioned ideological determinism that 
naively under-estimates economic and state power in a manner which critics such as 
Perry Anderson have rightly condemned.104 
 
Finally, Gramsci’s reliance on the economic conception of a competitive-
compromise equilibrium – especially in relation to the ‘balancing function’ of a 
leading group in civil society - leads us to conclude that there is in the Prison 
Notebooks a peripheral and more realistic Gramsci who recognises that the Hegelian 
ideal of a harmonious and rational utopia that he frequently projected was exactly 
that.  The total ‘organic’ unity of a ‘regulated society’ that is often highlighted as one 
of the least attractive dimensions of Gramsci’s hegemony,105 is in effect upset by the 
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assumptions of the residual autonomy of ideological elements and the threat of 
hegemonic competition that underlies Gramsci’s recourse to the notion of a leading 
element that must persistently struggle to organize and maintain consent through 
ideological compromises, fusion, proportioning and checking.  The latter would of 
course be completely superfluous if the former was in fact achieved.  One might well 
of course argue with some justification that the authentic Gramsci of the Prison 
Notebooks is more Hegelian and ‘naively authoritarian’ than this article’s focus 
suggests,106 but this should not prevent us from developing what seems the most 
pertinent dimension of Gramsci’s hegemony for our own contemporary purposes.  In 
a world in which the plural, fragmented and malleable character of identity has 
become a commonplace, it once again seems to me that incorporating and 
developing Gramsci’s use of equilibrium within a more open, contingent and 
democratic theory of hegemony,107 could bear significant results in our continuing 
efforts to understand and explain political and ideological ascendancy. 
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